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Requirements

What the use case needs, in three groups, without saying how to achieve it. The design says how, and Coverage maps each requirement to the design and to the tests.

User requirements

ID Requirement Why From
R-U1 A researcher signs in once, and that covers all services a request passes through Researchers don't know which services are involved, and shouldn't need to UC1, UC2
R-U2 Work continues while the researcher is away, for as long as it runs Workflows outlast any browser session UC3
R-U3 Everyone with a valid account can sign in, whatever they may later be allowed to use Otherwise people can't find out how to get access UC5
R-U4 A service can tell "you aren't signed in properly" from "you have no access here" A portal can only offer a way in for the second one UC5
R-U5 A portal can take part whether or not it has a server side of its own Not every portal has or wants one UC1

Security requirements

ID Requirement Why From
R-S1 A credential stolen at one service is of no use at any other Limits a compromise to that service UC9
R-S2 Services in the middle hold no standing permission to act for researchers A stored permission is a target, and acts without a request behind it UC1, UC9
R-S3 Permission that must outlast a request (R-U2) is limited to the one service it's needed for, in time, and can be withdrawn Long-running work mustn't turn into standing permission UC3, UC9
R-S4 Each service verifies each request for itself, without relying on what the previous service says Services are run by different organisations UC2, UC9
R-S5 Each node decides for itself whom it accepts, whatever services before it decided Node operators answer for their infrastructure UC4
R-S6 A service can only pass requests on to services it was set up for A compromised service can't reach arbitrary others UC9
R-S7 Requests can't circulate between services forever A misconfiguration shouldn't take down a federation UC2, UC7
R-S8 A node can verify which services a request passed through Provenance can't rest on what those services say UC6
R-S9 Taking part needs ordinary, standards-based software, without changes specific to one deployment Some services are outside the federation's control UC8
R-S10 Use can be attributed to the researcher, and to the portal or workflow system involved Operators report on it UC6
R-S11 One request can be followed across all services it passed through Failures cross organisations UC7

Privacy requirements

ID Requirement Why From
R-P1 A service learns only what it needs about a researcher Data minimisation UC9
R-P2 A node can recognise the same researcher over time, without needing their name or email address Accounting and audits need a stable reference, not personal details UC6
R-P3 Credentials and personal details don't end up in logs or reports Logs are kept longer and read more widely UC7, UC9
R-P4 Researchers can see what is released about them, to whom They have to be able to trust the federation with it UC9